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Abstract
The flow of information reaching us via the online media platforms is optimized
not by the information content or relevance but by popularity and proximity
to the target. This is typically performed in order to maximise platform usage.
As a side effect, this introduces an algorithmic bias that is believed to enhance
polarization of the societal debate. To study this phenomenon, we modify the
well-known continuous opinion dynamics model of bounded confidence in order
to account for the algorithmic bias and investigate its consequences. In the
simplest version of the original model the pairs of discussion participants are
chosen at random and their opinions get closer to each other if they are within
a fixed tolerance level. We modify the selection rule of the discussion partners:
there is an enhanced probability to choose individuals whose opinions are al-
ready close to each other, thus mimicking the behavior of online media which
suggest interaction with similar peers. As a result we observe: a) an increased
tendency towards polarization, which emerges also in conditions where the orig-
inal model would predict convergence, and b) a dramatic slowing down of the
speed at which the convergence at the asymptotic state is reached, which makes
the system highly unstable. Polarization is augmented by a fragmented initial
population.
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1 Introduction
Political polarization is a generally observed, ingravescent negative trend in
modern western societies [1, 2, 21, 22] with such concomitants as “alternative
realities”, “filter bubbles”, “echo chambers”, and “fake news”. Several causes
have been identified (see, e.g., [3]) but there is increasing evidence that new
online media is one of them [4, 5, 6]. Earlier it was assumed that traditional
mass media mostly influence the politically active elite of the society and they
only indirectly affect polarization of the entire population. The recent dramatic
changes with the occurrence of online media, the ubiquity of the Internet with
all the information within reach of a few clicks and the general usage of online
social networks have increased the number of communication channels by which
political information can reach citizens. Somewhat counterintuitively, this has
not lead to a more balanced information acquisition and a stronger tendency
towards consensus, as argued in [7], on the contrary. One of the reasons may be
that the new media have enhanced the reachability of people, which can be used
for transmitting simplified political answers to complex questions and thus act
toward polarization [8]. Moreover, the stream of news is not organized in the
new media in a balanced way, but by algorithms, which are built to maximise
platform usage. It is conjectured that this generates an “algorithmic bias”,
which artificially enhances opinion polarization. This is an artefact of online
platforms, also called ”algorithmic segregation” [9]. The link between opinion
polarization and algorithmic bias from online platforms has not been proven
to date, so the aim of the present paper is to study this effect by a simple,
bounded-confidence-type opinion dynamics model.
A considerable and rapidly increasing part of the population does not use
traditional media (printed press, radio, TV or even online journals) for obtaining
news [10, 11, 12] but turns to the new media like online social networks or blogs.
However, the flow of news in the new media is not selected by the information
value but rather by popularity, by ”likes” [13]. As people tend to identify
themselves with views similar to their own and will like corresponding news
with higher probability, it is in the interest of the service providers to channel
the information already in a targeted way. This means users do not even get
confronted with narratives different from their favorite ones. Large effort is
paid to develop efficient algorithms for the appropriate channeling of the news
to provide the stream that has the highest chance to collect maximum number
of likes.
Another important factor pointing in the same direction is related to the
”share” function, which is largely responsible for the fast spreading of news and
thus enhancing popularity. This spreading takes place on the social network,
where links are formed mostly as a consequence of homophily, i.e., exchange
of information takes place between people with similar views. The variety of
interactions of a person (family, school, work, hobby, etc.) may contribute to
diversification of information sources [14], nevertheless, regarding political views
homophily seems particularly strong [15]. The sharing among users with similar
beliefs was also shown to be true in the context of spreading of misinformation
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on Facebook, leading to an echo-chamber effect [20], as well as on Twitter where
partisan users were demonstrated to have an important role in polarization [24].
Network effects are obviously very important in the spreading of news and
opinions, however, in our present study we will ignore the network structure
of the system and will exclusively focus on the consequences of the algorithmic
bias for selecting the content presented to the users. This corresponds to a
mean field approach, which is widely used as a first approximation to spreading
problems [16].
The task is therefore to model the evolution of the attitude of the society,
provided there is a bias in selecting partners whose opinions are confronted. Re-
cent years has seen the introduction of several models of opinion dynamics [19],
however none of them includes algorithmic bias in the sense described here.
Hence we provide an extension of one of the existing models to study this effect.
For the sake of simplicity we use a bounded confidence opinion dynamics model
[17], which is known to be able to describe both consensus and polarization of
opinions depending on the tolerance level of the agents. In the mean field ver-
sion two agents are selected at random and their opinions, represented by real
numbers, get closer if they are within the tolerance level. The bias is introduced
such that already at the selection of the partners their opinions are considered
and agents with closer opinions are selected with higher probability. With this
simple modification we see two effects. First, the tendency toward consensus is
hindered, i.e., larger tolerance level is needed to achieve consensus; second, the
approach to the asymptotic state is slowed down tremendously. Therefore, the
selection bias affects the opinion formation process in two profound ways: a) by
exacerbating polarization, which emerges also in conditions where the original
model would predict consensus, and b) by slowing down the spreading process,
which makes the system highly unstable.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model
in detail. Section Results contains the results of the simulations. We close the
paper with a discussion and an account of further research.
2 The model
The original bounded confidence model [17] considers a population of N individ-
uals, where each individual i holds a continuous opinion xi ∈ [0, 1]. This opinion
can be considered the degree by which an individual agrees or not to a certain
position. Individuals are connected by a complete social network, and interact
pairwise at discrete time steps. The interacting pair (i, j) is selected randomly
from the population at each time point t. After interaction, the two opinions,
xi and xj may change, depending on a so called bounded confidence parameter
ε ∈ [0, 1]. This can be seen as a measure of the open-mindedness of individuals
in a population. It defines a threshold on the distance between the opinion of
the two individuals, beyond which communication between individuals is not
possible due to conflicting views.
If we define the distance between two opinions xi and xj as dij = |xi − xj |,
3
then information is exchanged between the two individuals only if dij ≤ ε,
otherwise nothing happens. The exchange of information results in the two
opinions becoming closer to one another, modulated by a convergence parameter
µ ∈ (0, 0.5]
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + µ(xj(t)− xi(t))
xj(t+ 1) = xj(t) + µ(xi(t)− xj(t))
In the following we consider only the case of µ = 0.5, hence when both individ-
uals take the average opinion.
To introduce algorithmic bias in the interaction between individuals, we
modify the procedure by which the pair i, j is selected. In the original model,
i and j are selected uniformly at random from the population. Instead, algo-
rithmic bias makes encounters of similar individuals more probable. To account
for this, we first select i, then the selection of j is performed with a probability
that depends on dij :
pi(j) =
d−γij∑
k 6=i d
−γ
ik
(1)
In this way, the probability to select j once i was selected is larger if dij is
smaller, i.e. alike individuals interact more. The parameter γ is the strength of
the algorithmic bias: the larger γ, the more rare will be the encounters among
individuals with distant opinions. For γ = 0 we obtain the original bounded
confidence model, pi(j) =
1
N−1 .
In the following we will analyse the new model numerically, through simu-
lation of the opinion formation process. To avoid undefined operations in Eq 1,
when dik = 0 (k 6= i), we use a lower bound for dik, dε. So, if dik < dε then dik
is replaced with dε in Eq 1. We use dε = 0.0001 in the following.
3 Results
In order to understand how the introduction of the algorithmic bias affects
model performance, we study the model under multiple criteria for various com-
binations of parameters ε and γ. We are interested in whether the population
converges to consensus or to multiple opinion clusters (Section 3.1), and how
fast convergence appears (Section 3.2). For this we concentrate on the transi-
tion between one and two clusters. We also consider the influence of the size
of the population on the behavior observed, both for the original and extended
model (Section 3.3). Furthermore, the effect of a segregated initial population
is studied (Section 3.4). For each analysis we repeat simulations multiple times
to account for the stochastic nature of the model, and show average values
obtained for each criterion above.
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Figure 1: Number of clusters obtained for various ε and γ. The top
panel shows the space for 0.2 ≤ ε ≤ 1 while the bottom panel zooms into the
area where 0.2 ≤ ε ≤ 0.4. Values are averaged over 85 runs.
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3.1 Consensus versus opinion segregation
The behaviour of the original bounded confidence model is defined by the param-
eter ε [17]. When this is large enough, an initially uniformly random population
converges to consensus, while as ε decreases, clusters emerge in the population.
It was shown that the number of major clusters can be approximated by b 12εc.
This approximation ignores minor clusters that may emerge in some situations
[18].
In the following we analyse the number of clusters obtained for our extended
model, starting from an uniform initial distribution of opinions, for a population
of size N = 500. We concentrate on the area in the (ε, γ) space where, in the
original model, the number of clusters is smaller or equal to 2, i.e. ε ≥ 0.2. In
order to quantify the number of clusters, given the existence of major and minor
clusters, we use the cluster participation ratio as a criterion. This takes into
account not only the number of clusters, but also the fraction of the population
in each, measuring thus the effective number of clusters. Hence two perfectly
equal clusters will result in a cluster participation ratio of 2, however if one
cluster is larger, the measure will take a value in (1, 2). The effective number of
clusters measured in this section is thus computed as:
C =
(
∑
i ci)
2∑
i c
2
i
(2)
where ci is the size of cluster i.
Fig 1 displays the effective number of clusters for various ε and γ values,
using averages over multiple runs. The top panel shows results for ε between
0.2 and 1, while the bottom panel zooms in to the area where ε is between 0.2
and 0.4. Note that in these simulations, the population converges to either one,
two or three major clusters of similar mass, plus some minor negligible clusters.
For the same parameter setting, the population may converge to one cluster in
some simulations, or to two clusters in others. We present the average values
as obtained for 85 independent runs.
The plot shows that our simulations reproduce perfectly the behaviour of
the original model (γ = 0), where a transition between 2 and 1 cluster takes
place for ε ∈ [0.25, 0.3]. It is clear that the introduction of γ > 0 causes an
increase in the effective number of clusters, compared to the original model.
For instance, for ε = 0.35, the original model results in one cluster, while for
our model, new clusters start to emerge for γ ≥ 1.3. For ε = 0.32, the transition
starts even earlier before γ = 1, with the average number of clusters very close
to 2 at γ = 1.6. For the case of ε = 0.2, when the original number of clusters was
already 2, γ increases C towards 3 opinion clusters. Hence, it appears from our
simulations that algorithmic bias causes segregation in the bounded confidence
model, by increasing the number of clusters with increasing bias.
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Figure 2: Total number of interactions required for convergence normalized by
the number of individuals, averaged over 85 runs.
3.2 Time to convergence
While the asymptotic number of opinion clusters is very important, the time
to obtain these clusters is equally so. In a real setting, available time is finite,
and so if consensus forms only after a very long period of time, it may never
actually emerge in the real population. Thus, we measure the time needed for
convergence (to either one or more opinion clusters) in our extended model.
This can be counted as total number of pairwise interactions required to obtain
a stable configuration, divided by N , the population size.
Fig 2 shows how the total number of interactions required depends on both
ε and γ. It is clear that the time to convergence grows very fast with γ, for all
ε values, including the situation when the population converges to consensus.
This indicates that, in a real setting with finite observation time this consensus
may not emerge at all. Hence γ has a double segregation effect: not only the
number of clusters grows, but consensus becomes extremely slow as well.
To support this observation, we show in Fig 3 the evolution of the population
for various values of γ, when ε = 1 and ε = 0.32. In the first case (ε = 1), the
population always converges to one cluster, however we can notice the increase
in the number of iterations required, with many clusters coexisting for a long
period of time before convergence. When ε = 0.32, the original Deffuant model
results in one cluster, with fast convergence. As γ grows, convergence slows
down first, and when γ reaches a certain threshold two clusters emerge. The
case where γ = 1.1 is close to the transition. It is particularly interesting,
because we can notice that initially two clusters coexist for a while, but they
eventually merge into one cluster. In other simulation instances with the same
parameter values, the two clusters never merge.
Another observation emerging from Fig 2 is that, besides the general fast
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Figure 3: Evolution of the population of opinions for various γ and ε
values. The first row corresponds to the case where ε = 1, while the second
row corresponds to ε = 0.32. In both cases γ ∈ {0, 1, 1.1, 1.6} (left to right).
growth of the time to convergence, we also observe a smaller peak in the conver-
gence time for an ε between 0.25 and 0.35, for all values of γ. This corresponds
to a slowing down of convergence around the phase transition (from one to two
clusters), which is a known physical phenomenon.
One may argue, however, that measuring the time as the total number of
interactions may inflate the figures. Each interaction can have 3 outcomes: (1)
nothing happens because a pair of individuals with identical opinions (xi = xj)
were selected, (2) nothing happens because of bounded confidence dij > ε or
(3) the two opinions actually change. In the following we denominate the third
type of interaction as ‘active’ interactions.
Fig 4 details the total and active number of interactions for the example case
of ε = 0.4. Both measures grow like exp(γσ) where σ ∼ 3.4, with a small differ-
ence visible between active and total interactions. This extremely fast growth
of the convergence time means that, in practice, consensus is hindered even by
weak algorithmic bias, since consensus is slow to form, hence the population
stays in a disordered state for a long time.
3.3 Finite size effects
A third analysis that we performed aimed at understanding whether the size
of the population plays a role in the effect of the algorithmic bias. Again, this
is important for realistic scenarios, since opinion formation may happen both
at small and at large scale. Hence we look at the transition between consensus
and segregation for variable population sizes, both for the original and for the
extended model.
In the original model, the transition between c and c+1 clusters is shown to
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Figure 4: Time to convergence. Normalized total, non-null difference and
active number of interactions required for convergence for ε = 0.4. The reference
35 exp(γ3.4) is shown as a visual aid only.
Figure 5: Number of clusters without algorithmic bias. Effective number
of clusters obtained for various ε and N , when γ = 0. Values are averaged over
200, 125, 85, 45 and 45 runs for N ∈ {100, 250, 500, 750, 1000}, respectively.
Error bars show one standard deviation from the mean.
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Figure 6: Number of clusters with algorithmic bias. Effective number of
clusters obtained for various ε, γ and N . Values are averaged over 200, 125,
85, 45 and 45 runs for N ∈ {100, 250, 500, 750, 1000}, respectively. Error bars
show one standard deviation from the mean.
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be continuous, with an interval for ε where both cases can appear in different
simulation instances (see Fig 4 in [17]). In particular, the transition between
one and two clusters happens for  ∈ (0.25, 0.3). We performed numerical simu-
lations to test whether this interval changes with N , given that, to the authors’
knowledge, a detailed study in this direction does not exist for the bounded con-
fidence model. Fig 5 shows the mean effective number of clusters over multiple
runs obtained with N ∈ {100, 250, 500, 750, 1000}. Error bars represent one
standard deviation from the mean. It is clear that, as N increases, the transi-
tion becomes more abrupt, i.e. the transition interval decreases in length, and
gets closer to ε = 0.25. For very small populations, in particular, the number
of clusters in the transition area is larger, probably due to a lower density of
opinions in the starting population, which facilitates formation of clusters even
when larger populations would converge to consensus. Hence we can conclude
that a small N can also favour segregation. The error bars are almost invisible
outside the phase transition interval, but quite large inside this interval. This
is due to the fact that within the transition interval some simulations converge
to one cluster, while other to two clusters, obtaining thus large standard devia-
tions from the mean. analyse the effect of the population size when γ > 0, we
consider two different ε values (0.3 and 0.32). These were chosen because for
γ = 0 they yield one cluster, while segregation emerges as γ grows. Fig 6 shows
the effective number of clusters obtained for various population sizes. Again,
the transition from one to two clusters is more steep in γ as N increases, with
small population sizes favouring segregation. In these conditions, it seems that
algorithmic bias can actually be more efficient in hindering consensus for smaller
groups.
3.4 Effect of the initial condition
Previous results were obtained for the case where numerical simulations assumed
uniformly random initial opinions in the population. However, in reality, opinion
formation may start from slightly fragmented initial conditions. To simulate
this, we introduced artificially a symmetric gap around the opinion value 0.5,
to simulate a population where opinions are already forming. The width of the
gap was varied to understand the effect of various fragmentation levels both for
the original bounded confidence model (γ = 0) and for our extension.
Fig 7 shows the mean effective number of clusters obtained for various gap
sizes, with error bars showing one standard deviation from the mean. For the
original model, the gap shifts the transition from two to one cluster towards
larger values of . Hence a fragmented initial condition favors fragmentation
even later during the evolution of opinions. However, as  grows, fragmentation
disappears, hence a higher tolerance level can overcome a fragmented initial
condition. We also note that as γ grows, the two effects from algorithmic bias
and initial fragmentation add up to push the transition to consensus ever closer
to  = 1. Error bars show again how in the transition interval the popula-
tion converges to one cluster is some simulations and to two clusters in others,
resulting in relatively large deviations from the mean. However, outside the
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Figure 7: Initial condition. Effect of the initial condition on the effective
number of clusters (averages over 10 runs).
12
Figure 8: Effect of the initial condition on the convergence time measured in
number of active interactions (averages over 10 runs).
13
transition interval error bars are almost invisible, hence the number of cluster
is very stable from one simulation to another.
In terms of time for convergence, Fig 8 plots the number of active inter-
actions for the case of a fragmented initial condition. It appears that initial
fragmentation speeds up convergence when the final population is also frag-
mented. However, when the final population reaches consensus (one cluster),
the effect is reversed, i.e. initial fragmentation slows down convergence. The
time to convergence continues to grow very fast with γ, as seen previously for a
uniform initial condition.
Hence, again, the two effects appear to work together against reaching con-
sensus, either by favoring the appearance of additional clusters or by slowing
down consensus when this could, in principle, emerge.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
A model of algorithmic bias in the framework of bounded confidence was pre-
sented, and its behavior analyzed. Algorithmic bias is a mechanism that encour-
ages interaction among like-minded individuals, similar to patterns observed in
real social network data. We found that, for this model, algorithmic bias hinders
consensus and favors opinion segregation through two different mechanisms. On
one hand, consensus is hindered by a very strong slowdown of convergence, so
that even when one cluster is asymptotically obtained, the time to reach it is
so long that in practice consensus will never appear. Additionally, we observed
segregation of the population as the bias grows stronger, with the number of
clusters obtained increasing compared to the original model. A fragmented ini-
tial condition also enhances the fragmentation, augmenting the effect of the
algorithmic bias. Additionally, we observed that small populations may be less
resilient to segregation, due to finite size effects.
The results presented here are based on the assumption that bounded confi-
dence exists, i.e. individuals with very distinct opinions do not exchange infor-
mation hence do not influence each other. However, our conclusions regarding
the fact that algorithmic bias hinders consensus still stand even when bounded
confidence is removed (i.e. ε = 1). In this case, consensus still becomes ex-
tremely slow as the bias increases, hence is never achieved in practice, a result
that we believe will apply to any other model of opinion dynamics. It would
also be interesting to see how taking into account a more realistic social net-
work structure among individuals, instead of a complete graph where anybody
may interact with anybody else, would impact the opinion formation process,
possibly exacerbating the effects observed in this study.
Although there is evidence that many types of social interactions are sub-
ject to algorithmic bias, the debate still continues on whether this generates or
not opinion segregation in the long term. Our numerical results support the
first option, which we plan to analyse in more detail in the future by applying
our model to real data from social network processes. We would also like to
understand how external information could affect the behavior observed, espe-
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cially when the sources of information are also selected based on a similar bias.
Recent work on how to counteract opinion polarisation on social networks has
also appeared [23], and initial results suggest that facilitating interaction among
chosen individuals in polarised communities can alleviate the issue. We will also
investigate this with our model.
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